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This paper examines the impact of State-local grants on tax effort of rural
local governments (panchayats) for Kerala state. The results from data for 1993-
94 show, after controlling for tax capacity, a greater and more uniform negative
impact on own tax revenue of lumpsum "untied" grants that are predictable and
unvarying than in the case of a more widely defined grants total including
components with year-to-year variability. An increase in the untied grant to
panchayats by one rupee reduces own tax revenue in twelve out of fourteen
districts by more than one rupee, and in eight of these by more than two rupees.
The reduction in own tax revenue has to have been the result of a selective
slackening of tax effort since refunds of panchayat-level taxes in proportion to
incidence are ruled out. The post-grant pattern of incidence will therefore be less
transparent than the nominal pattern, less preserving of voter preferences, and
possibly driven by corruption towards greater regressivity. Given also the
balanced budget constraint on panchayats, there is a corollary contradiction of
the flypaper effect found in other contexts. The two districts for which the general
result does not hold are also the most ethnically fragmented. This result has
implications dissimilar to those in the received literature on the fiscal effects of
ethnic fragmentation.
JEL Classification: H71, H77
Keywords: tax effort, flypaper effect, ethnofractionalisation.
------------------------
* National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. Corresponding author:
indira_raja@yahoo.com.
The authors are deeply grateful to Mr. P.M. Abraham and Mr. Vinod Rai for
making available the data used. An earlier version of this paper, NIPFP
WP1/April 2000, elicited very useful comments from a number of people. The
authors thank all of them, in particular Prof. Roger Gordon and Drs. Shantayanan
Devarajan and Martin Muhleisen, with the usual disclaimer.2
I.  Introduction
In federal governance structures, with a defined tax domain at each tier of
governance and vertical transfers across tiers, the issue of whether these
transfers have an impact on the tax effort at the recipient tier of government
assumes some importance. This paper investigates the impact on tax effort at
rural local government (panchayat) level, of transfers from the State government,
for the State of Kerala.
Three institutional features of the federal fiscal setting in India need to be
made explicit at the outset because they are not necessarily common to all
federal settings. First, inter-governmental transfers in India are unidirectional
downwards.
1 Second, although local governments are at the third tier and
receive transfers from both the first (Central) and second (State) tiers, Central
transfers are tied to particular programmes principally for employment provision
and carry no pre-determined annual regularity for any particular village
panchayat.
2 Central employment funds are disbursed on an assortment of
considerations, among them panchayat initiatives towards submission of suitable
public works proposals. State government transfers by contrast carry annual
regularity, and go towards the annual panchayat budget, although within this
category grants are more regularly disbursed than shared taxes; see section II.
The third institutional feature of third tier government everywhere in India is that
they are not permitted to run a fiscal deficit. The particular form of this constraint
                                           
1     Unlike China where there has been upward sharing since the fiscal reform of the early
nineteen eighties.
2     There are other Central fund flows directly to districts, but the expenditure of these funds is
entrusted to district-level agencies specific to each programme. The employment programmes
alone entrust funds for wage payments to panchayats.3
in Kerala is the requirement of a 5 per cent surplus of receipts
3 over
expenditures.
The impact of transfers from above on own tax effort has been empirically
investigated in India for Centre-State transfers (Jha et.al., 1995 and ISI, 1999),
4
but not for State-local transfers because of data limitations. The State Finance
Commissions, appointed in most
5 States consequent upon the granting of
Constitutional status to local government in 1993,
6 confronted an information
vacuum on panchayat finances, and sparse local fiscal domains.
Kerala was an exception. The Kerala data on panchayat finances used
here were collected by the First State Finance Commission, and relate to the
fiscal domain as it existed prior to the Constitutional change of status, and
needless to add, prior to the changes recommended by the Commission itself.
The purpose of the exercise reported in this paper is to assess the impact of
transfers within a fiscal configuration that was known and in place over a period
of time, since a tax effort response would in the nature of things develop over
time. The data used are for 1993-94, the fourth year for which the unaltered fiscal
regime was in place.
There is in theory no efficiency problem with the substitution of State
revenue transfers for local revenues, if that is in accordance with local
preferences. Indeed, the whole fiscal illusion literature on the flypaper effect of
transfers from outside, attempts to understand why transfers from above are
                                           
3   “Excluding receipts on endowments, Government contributions and debt accounts” (Interim
Report, 1995:13). Presumably the Government contributions referred to  are irregular, ad hoc
contributions. The reference to debt accounts specifically precludes borrowing.
4      Also for foreign aid transfers on national tax effort, by Jha and Swaroop, 1998.
5      With exceptions; see Rajaraman, 2000.
6    The 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments became operative in each State only after
enactment of the requisite conformity legislation at State government level, which is the tier
vested with legislative power over local governments.4
found empirically to increase public expenditure to their full extent, unlike an
equivalent increase in voter income, and why local tax refunds are not more
commonly observed. The key assumption here though is that local revenues
collected would be refunded to individuals in some proportionality to taxes paid,
or equivalently by a rate reduction across the board.
An important institutional feature of local government (and indeed
government at any level) in India is that unspent revenues are never distributable
to local taxpayers as a refund. Given this, and given also the institutional and
legislative rigidities standing in the way of a uniform rate reduction for all taxes,
any negative impact on own taxes of transfers from above implies a selective,
most likely non-transparent, slackening of own tax effort. What is important is that
the direction of slackening of tax effort opens corruption opportunities, and is in
general unlikely to preserve voter preferences.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper examines the empirical
evidence for Kerala panchayats on the impact of State transfers on own tax
effort. Section II presents relevant details on the composition of revenue receipts
of panchayats, in both the own tax and transfer categories. Section III presents
the empirical findings. Section IV discusses the findings in the context of the
fiscal illusion literature. Section V concludes with some policy implications. A
statistical appendix presents descriptive statistics.
Although the empirical exercise is specific to the Kerala context, the
results permit conclusions of general validity in terms of the impact of grant
structures on fiscal behaviour.
II Revenue and Grant Receipts of Kerala Panchayats
In what follows, the description of constituents of taxes and grants pertain
to the data year 1993-94; to the situation as it then obtained, prior to the5
conformity Act of 1994,
7 prior even to the setting up of the First State Finance
Commission; indeed, the data used were collected by the Commission.
Tax revenues of panchayats in Kerala have the two following constituents:
1.  Own taxes from the legislated fiscal domain of panchayats, consist
principally of taxes on buildings, professions
8 and entertainment, with
associated surcharges and/or additionalities.
9 There is also an
assortment of other levies termed service taxes, for sanitation, water,
street lighting and drainage services, which might more correctly be
classified as non-tax revenues. Their classification as taxes however
ensures that the only exclusions from own taxes are relatively minor
collections from registration and other licensing fees; and income from
panchayat properties (rentals on buildings, bus-stands, and ferry
services). Own taxes are thus the dominant component of own revenue
collections of panchayats.
2.  Shared taxes collected by the State government and fully given to
panchayats, consist principally of a land tax (termed a “basic” tax), and a
surcharge on stamp duty on transfer of property. A tax on motor vehicles
is partially shared (Interim Report: 55-56).
Observed own tax revenue is an outcome of (unobserved) tax effort and
(unobserved) tax capacity. By virtue of its constituents, own tax capacity will
clearly be higher the larger the population of the panchayat. Variations in
                                           
7     The Kerala Panchayat Raj Act 1994.
8      Profession taxes in other States are levied by State governments. They consist in essence of
a lump-sum tax on practitioners of “professions”, defined usually to exclude agriculture. The tax
may or may not vary across professions.
9   There was an additional tax on entertainment; and a show tax which is levied per showing
rather than per ticket and is therefore not passed on. The show tax and building tax both carried
surcharges. At State and Central government levels, surcharges rather than alterations in the
base rate of levy may be the preferred option in the case of taxes shared with lower-level
governments, where surcharges do not carry the sharing obligation of the base levy (the reverse
can also be true). The reason for additionalities in these forms at panchayat level, where there is
no further sharing, is not immediately apparent.6
prosperity across panchayats are unfortunately impossible to capture since even
agricultural production, let alone GDP, is not available below district level. Pooled
estimation across all districts could at best assume constancy of per capita
income across panchayats within each district, with the GDP proxy given by the
product of this and population. What is done however is independent estimation
for each district, with population as the proxy for taxable capacity.
The sharing formula of State taxes shared with panchayats is only partially
by jurisdiction of collection, so that shared tax receipts are not an indicator of the
taxable capacity of the panchayat.
10 This is unfortunate from an estimation
standpoint, because shared taxes, levied on assets and asset turnover, could if
jurisdictionally shared have provided a better proxy than population to taxable
capacity. Also, arrears in shared tax flows (Interim Report: 54-57), on account of
tax collections not being known with certainty until well after the close of the
financial year, make for a noise element in shared taxes present to a lesser
degree in grant flows, which are specified in absolute terms and not in
percentages of revenue collections.
Shared taxes are termed “statutory” grants because shares are enshrined
in the statutes under which State taxes are collected. All other grants are termed
non-statutory even though they too have a legislative basis.
11 Non-statutory
grants to panchayats from the State government in 1993-94 consisted of:
                                           
10    The jurisdictional component in 1993-94 existed only for the land tax (75%). Non-jurisdictional
shares were based on road maintenance norms (for the vehicle tax), population (for 75% of the
stamp duty), and a variety of considerations including inverse proportionality to tax capacity (for
25% of the land tax and stamp duty). The SFC suggested alternative formulae with a tax effort
element in the non-jurisdictional component obtained from the ratio of collections to “demands”
(i.e. assessments), but these were rejected by the State government because of their complexity;
a simpler formula of 90% by population, and 10% by area was adopted instead. This formula was
not in place in 1993-94.
11 Aggregating across both types, there were 23 grant categories in all (SFC Final Report: 256).7
1.  A block grant for developmental  purposes, termed an “untied” grant
because it did not carry any specific obligations in terms of heads of
expenditure.
2.  Other grants termed either “specific purpose” or “general purpose” grants.
Untied grants
12 were received by all panchayats, so much so, that the few
panchayats in each district not receiving untied grants were incomplete in other
respects as well and were therefore deleted from the data set.  This grant
category however came into existence only in 1990 (SFC Final Report: 99). Thus
1993-94, the data year, was the fourth (and final) year for which these types of
grants were received. The recording of the other grants in the questionnaire was
not always fully broken down by grant category, and did not therefore enable any
reliable answers in terms of pattern of receipt across panchayats.
Appendix table A1 shows the per panchayat and per capita receipts of
untied and total grants by district. The table supports the following stylisations:
1.  The untied grant per panchayat is remarkably uniform across districts, at
around Rs 2 lakh. Total grants show greater variation across districts
around a mean a little over Rs 3 lakh.
2. Untied grants constitute two-thirds, and thus the major share, of total
grants.
3.  The uniformity in the per panchayat untied grant receipt across districts
shows clearly that it is in conception a lumpsum grant.
4.  The lumpsum nature of untied grants per panchayat is further reinforced
by the higher coefficient of variation across districts in the untied grant
receipt per capita.
5.  There is much greater variation within districts in untied grant receipts per
panchayat than across districts.
                                           
12   These are “Plan” grants, for funding of developmental activities, which could be capital works.8
The within-district variation clearly calls for examination so as to uncover
the grant distribution formula that emerges from the data. Table A2 shows
district-wise results of regressing untied grants on panchayat area and
population. For nine of the fourteen districts, the area covered by the panchayat
carries a positive and very significant coefficient; the magnitude of the coefficient
itself varies, as might be expected given the basic uniformity in per panchayat
allocation across districts of varying spatial coverage. What is more important is
whether the coefficient of population is negative and statistically significant, which
is the case for only one district (Malapuram). The coefficient of population is
positive and significant for three districts (Pathanamthitta, Idukki and Ernakulam),
showing grants to be positively related to tax capacity in these. All three districts
carry an insignificant coefficient for area, and so the result could merely reflect
multicollinearity. Further, the explanatory value of the equation in these three
cases is negligible. With population the best available proxy for taxable capacity,
the empirical data thus support the following stylisations:
1.  There is no empirical evidence that the distribution formula for untied
grants between panchayats within a district is redistributive in the sense of
compensating for low taxable capacity (except for one district,
Malapuram).
2.  There is very strong evidence that the formula used in many districts aims
at equity between panchayats by being calibrated to the geographical
spread of each.
3.  The explanatory power of area and population varies quite considerably
across districts. Discretionary latitude with respect to allocation between
panchayats would thus appear to have been decentralised to district-
level,
13 with no uniform formula laid down for all districts to follow.
                                           
13   The panchayat system is itself mandatorily three-tiered after the Constitutional amendment of
1993, but in 1993-94 in Kerala, there was only a single-tier, at village level. There would
nevertheless have been the district-level administrative department of the State government,
which might have been the decision making body on allocation of untied grants.9
To conclude, Kerala panchayats in 1993-94 had a well-defined own fiscal
domain, with taxes defined to include all but a negligible element of total self-
collected revenue. The constituents of own taxes suggest total population as a
justifiable proxy for (unobserved) taxable capacity at panchayat level. Grants
from the State government had a dominant lumpsum component in untied grants,
which does not appear from the evidence of the figures either across or within
districts, to have been principally redistributive in intent. The mean per panchayat
untied grant varies more within than across districts, with the within-district
variation explained by geographical area. There is no statistical evidence
whatever of any inverse relationship between untied grants and taxable capacity
as proxied by population, except for the district (Malapuram).
Thus, untied grants in 1993-94 in Kerala offer a uniquely well-designed
opportunity to test the impact of a lumpsum grant with no inverse proportionality
to taxable capacity, with what was then (1993-94) an expectation of annual
regularity. With the State government acceptance of the SFC recommendation
that a lumpsum grant of this type be phased out in favour of more co-ordinated
funding of programmes formulated by the District Planning Committee, which is
one of the mandated bodies under the Constitutional amendment of 1993 (SFC
Final Report: 108), there should now be in place an altered grant regime with
greater year-to year variability in receipts by a particular panchayat.
III. Data and Empirical Results
The descriptive statistics of table A.1 already referred to were obtained
after elimination of those observations for which data on untied grants were not
available. The final data set so obtained on panchayat revenues for the year
1993-94 covered 938 panchayats
14 in aggregate across the fourteen districts into
which the State is divided.
                                           
14     Out of a total of 966 panchayats; data on 28 of these were incomplete.10
Table 1 shows the results for each district of regressing own taxes on total
grants, after controlling for population, the tax capacity proxy. The coefficient of
population is positive and highly significant for all districts, the value of the
coefficient ranging in most cases between Rs 22 and Rs 29 per head (annual).
The coefficient of total grants is negative for all but one district, but significant for
only six. The adjusted R
2 varies widely across districts.
Table 2 shows the results of using untied grants in place of total grants, as
the predictable core of what panchayats expect to receive each year. The
coefficient of population remains positive and significant for all districts. But what
is of interest is that the coefficient of grants is negative and  significant for all but
two districts (Idukki and Wyanad). The explanatory ability of this specification is
much higher in every district, with the same two exceptions of Idukki and
Wyanad. The coefficient of untied grants is consistently (in absolute value)
greater than one.
The intercept term in the second specification is significant in some cases,
unlike the case with total grants, suggesting an underlying non-linearity. A further
specification of own taxes per capita, which normalises own tax revenues by the
capacity proxy, on population and untied grants per capita (table 3) is not very
successful in terms of the adjusted R
2. The second order effect of population
carries significance only in four cases where it is negative, and one where it is
positive. But the coefficient of untied grants per capita remains negative, and is
significant in nine out of fourteen districts.
Thus, the results show that an increase in the untied grant to panchayats
by one rupee reduces own tax revenues by more than one rupee in twelve out of
fourteen districts, after controlling for the taxable capacity of the panchayat as
proxied by population. Reverse causality is ruled out by the regressions reported
in table A2, with the single possible exception of Malapuram district, which shows
the highest (negative) coefficient. The contrast between the results for total11
grants, which are more variable year to year, and the results for untied grants,
the predictable and unvarying core of total grants, is especially noteworthy.
IV. The Results in the Flypaper Context
The flypaper effect is the empirical finding for subnational governments
that lumpsum grants increase expenditures more than equivalent increases in
voter incomes (Fisher, 1982, Turnbull, 1992 and Hines and Thaler, 1995).
Intergovernmental grants in India carry in general an expenditure
imperative. Grants always flow downward from higher-level governments, and
carry an accounting mechanism whereby the unspent portion must be returned to
the grantor. Given this and also the balanced budget constraint on local
government, the impact of grants on own tax revenues of panchayats
investigated in this paper carries, as a corollary, an expenditure impact by
implication.
The findings are specific to Kerala State in India, but given the absence of
data on rural local governments in other States, the empirical exercise here
provides a first glimpse of the tax effort (and, by extension, the expenditure)
response at local level to grants. The exercise has been performed separately for
each district of the State, because there is no adequate proxy for tax capacity
across districts. The disaggregated exercise also allows for variations in the own
tax effort response. The population of the panchayat serves as a good proxy for
tax capacity.
In all but two out of fourteen districts, grants have a statistically significant
negative impact on own tax revenues, after controlling for tax capacity, with the
coefficient in all cases greater than one in absolute value.12
Thus, the empirical results contradict the flypaper effect found in other
contexts. At the same time, they cannot quite be interpreted as affirming the
absence of fiscal illusion. To the extent that the configuration of taxes payable to
local and State governments conforms however imperfectly to the marginal
propensities of the utility-maximising median voter, the reduction in own tax
revenues by more than the amount of the grant cannot possibly be consistent
with voter preferences. The tax-SDP ratio of Kerala is reported in a recent
investigation of State-level tax performance (ISI, 1999) to have consistently since
the mid-eighties been in the top decile among all States. However, the issue here
is not where the tax-SDP ratio lies so much as whether the ratio conforms to the
utility-maximising tax level for the median voter. For a democratically elected
government, it has to be assumed that this is so.
Given further that the reduction in own tax revenues is not, and cannot be,
achieved through refunds of panchayat-level taxes in proportion to incidence, it
has to have been the result of a selective slackening of tax effort, making for a
post-grant pattern of incidence that is less transparent than the nominal pattern.
If further the nominal pattern conforms to voter preferences, the slackened
incidence will be more distortionary and therefore less efficient. If the new pattern
is driven by corruption, with some big players able to buy their way out of paying
taxes, it will also be more regressive.
The interesting aspect of the results is the narrow range within which the
coefficient of the  grants term lies across districts. Aside from showing the
robustness of the tax effort response to grants, it also suggests that the voter
mobility option, by which people can opt out of jurisdictions with unacceptable
outcomes, may not really be available. Idukki and Wyanad, the two exceptions,
where grants do not impact negatively on own taxes, happen also to be the
districts with the lowest population density in Kerala State (table A.3).13
Idukki and Wyanad are atypical in other respects as well. The low
dependency ratio and high share of agricultural among total workers indicate
poor diversification and reinforce the low taxable capacity correlate of low
population.  The two districts also have the highest scores on the
ethnofractionalisation index, which is a matter of considerable significance in the
context of recent results in the U.S. context (Alesina et.al. 1999), showing that
more ethnically diverse jurisdictions in the United States spend more, and less on
productive public goods, in line with political economy theories showing that
greater ethnic fragmentation leads to low valuation of public goods, higher
valuation of patronage, and absence of fiscal discipline (see Rubinfeld, 1987 for
an early treatment). The results here showing an absence of tax effort slackening
in the presence of ethnic fragmentation suggest that fragmentation may prevent
the consensus needed among local elites in respect of directions of tax effort
slackening. Thus greater ethnic fragmentation in the local context in India may
lead to more, rather than less, fiscal discipline.
V. Conclusions: Policy Implications
Economic efficiency requires that taxes to cover the cost of public goods
should be raised from within the beneficiary space of each, and that local public
goods carrying a distinctly local spatial reach (sanitation, water, street lighting,
law and order) should be paid for by taxes collected locally from property taxation
or user charges. Health and education, even though these carry a wider spatial
reach, also fall well within the functional domain of local government.
The problem with the way decentralisation has been conceptualised in
India is that the prescribed local functional domain extends far beyond that
definable as purely local in terms of spatial reach, and there has been no attempt
to define a commensurate local fiscal domain (Rajaraman, 2000). Thus, inter-
governmental grants become necessary for vertical equity, and that carries with it14
the possibility of reduced own tax effort of the kind observed in the Kerala
context.
The results from data on Kerala panchayat finances for 1993-94 show a
greater and more uniform negative impact on tax effort of lumpsum "untied"
grants that are predictable and unvarying than for a more widely defined grants
total that includes components with year-to-year variability. The untied grant
system then prevalent was a lumpsum amount of around Rs 2 lakh annually,
designed to add to panchayat resources for any purpose of their choosing. There
is no empirical evidence that the distribution formula for untied grants between
panchayats within districts was redistributive in the sense of compensating for
low taxable capacity, except for one district (Malapuram). Thus, untied grants in
1993-94 in Kerala offer a uniquely well-designed opportunity to test the impact of
a lumpsum grant with no inverse proportionality to taxable capacity, on tax effort.
The results show that an increase in the untied grant to panchayats by one rupee
reduces own tax revenues in twelve out of fourteen districts by more than one
rupee, and in eight of these by more than two rupees. Reverse causality is ruled
out with the single exception of Malapuram district.
These econometric results support anecdotal evidence from Kerala and
elsewhere that panchayats slacken in tax effort in response to funds from above.
Such slackening of tax effort is likely to be uneven, with the possibility that
corruption will drive the post-grant tax structure into greater regressivity, in
contrast to the nominal tax structure.
The new grant configuration in Kerala no longer has a lumpsum “untied”
core. The replacement of this by funding of district-level planned programmes,
with hopefully better performance monitoring, is an improvement over the
configuration as it prevailed during 1990-94.15
There remains a grants flow for routine expenditures. These have been
rationalised under a single head in place of what was earlier a large assortment,
which is in itself a good thing. However, the distribution formula (90% by
population; 10% by area) essentially goes with taxable capacity, and is a clear
compensation for a functional domain (inclusive of establishment expenditures
on wages and salaries) that outstrips the local fiscal domain. The attempt over
the long run should be to bring the two into conformity with one another, so that
there is no need for grants for routine expenditures. Grants for developmental
purposes must be tied to specific programmes with verifiable target outcomes.16
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Notes to all tables:  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.17
Table 2
















































































































Regression Results: Own Taxes Per Capita

























































































































































































































































Notes:   The coefficient of variation is given directly below the average in
               parentheses. The means across districts are unweighted.20
Table A.2




District Obs. Intercept Area Population Adj.
R
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Idukki 214.80 1.08 0.60 0.77 0.69
Wayanad 315.40 0.67 0.61 0.75 0.76
Pathanamthitta 449.79 1.19 0.70 0.59 0.65
Palakkad 531.75 2.38 0.65 0.60 0.63
Kasargod 537.91 1.07 0.67 0.48 0.63
Kannur 759.18 2.25 0.71 0.40 0.58
Kottayam 829.90 1.83 0.69 0.50 0.62
Malappuram 872.21 3.10 0.76 0.53 0.49
Thrissur 902.81 2.74 0.68 0.38 0.68
Kollam 966.51 2.41 0.68 0.46 0.65
Kozhikode 1117.72 2.62 0.73 0.32 0.59
Ernakulam 1170.43 2.82 0.67 0.32 0.68
Trivandrum 1344.27 2.95 0.67 0.47 0.61
Alappuzha 1415.29 2.00 0.66 0.40 0.58
Source: Census of India 1991: Series-12 Kerala.
  Part II- B(i)   Primary Census Abstract:  General Population
Notes:  1. The districts are ranked in ascending order by population density.
 2. Dependency ratio is the ratio of non-working (excluding marginal) workers
to total population. Agricultural workers comprise cultivators, agricultural
labourers and livestock, forestry, fishing and allied activities. Total
working population is confined to main workers.
 3.  EF is the index of ethnofractionalization
EF = 1-  ? fi 
2     i= 1……6
where fi = fraction of total population in the ith group.22
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